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All of the parties involved appear in the caption of the case. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has invested this Court with jurisdiction 
of this matter by virtue of its Order dated July 8, 1978 (reproduced infra at 
A-5) pursuant to its "pourover" authority. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court modifying 
the District Court's prior judgment in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellants George M. 
Baker and his mother, Delia A. Baker (hereinafter "the Bakers"). The case in 
the District Court was a civil action by the Bakers against a defaulting and 
defunct auto dealer (Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis) and the surety on his 
motor vehicle dealer's bond, Defendant-Respondent Western Surety Company. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was Respondent Western Surety's motion (dated February 6, 
1987) to modify the December, 1986, judgment of the District Court timely? 
2. Did the District Court have jurisdiction to modify its December, 
1986, judgment while that judgment was on appeal by Western Surety to the 
Utah Supreme Court? 
3. In view of the fact that Respondent Western Surety approved 
the December, 1986, judgment as to form, was it proper for the District Court 
to grant Western Surety's later motion to modify that judgment on the basis 
of mistake? 
4. Was the District Court's December, 1986, judgment void? 
5. Was it proper for the District Court to limit Appellants' 
execution on their December, 1986, judgment against Western Surety "to the 
bond?" 
6. Is Western Surety's cross-appeal barred by the Utah Supreme 
Court's dismissal of its prior appeal? 
7. Was Western Surety's cross-appeal timely filed? 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (reproduced infra 
at A-3) provides that "clerical mistakes" in a final judgment may be corrected 
after an appeal is docketed in the appellate court only Mwith leave of the 
appellate court.M 
Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (reproduced infra 
at A-2) requires that motions pursuant to Rule 59 must be filed within ten 
(10) days following the entry of the judgment. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (reproduced 
infra at A-4) requires that an appeal be filed within thirty days from the 
entry of the challenged order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a fundamentally simple action involving a defaulting motor 
vehicle dealer and his surety, which has been unconscionably complicated and 
protracted by the surety's persistent procedural efforts to avoid paying the 
judgment entered against it even though it has never challenged the ultimate 
merit of that judgment. Western Surety issued a motor vehicle dealer's bond 
to Defendant Craig Papa-Dakis. (Answer, Para. 6, R. at 27.) This bond1 
allowed Defendant Papa-Dakis to operate as a motor vehicle dealer within the 
state of Utah. 
The Bakers paid approximately $15,000.00 in cash for a vehicle for 
Mrs. Baker. (R. at 3.) Mrs. Baker, who is elderly, could not operate the 
*The bond is reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-14. 
3 
parking brake of the vehicle and Defendant Papa-Dakis agreed to replace the 
vehicle with another comparable vehicle of her choosing. (R. at 62.) The 
Bakers returned the first vehicle and were promised a replacement. The 
replacement vehicle was not forthcoming and, under pressure from the Bakers, 
Defendant Papa-Dakis' employees provided a temporary loaner. Ultimately, 
the Bakers were compelled by the rightful owners of the loaner to return 
that vehicle and have never been provided with either the title to the 
original vehicle or a refund of the purchase price. (R. at 63.) Defendant 
Papa-Dakis is now out of business and facing numerous criminal charges. 
Plaintiffs made claim upon Western Surety Company under its motor 
vehicle dealer's bond. Western Surety ignored that claim. Plaintiffs filed suit 
against Mr. Papa-Dakis and Western Surety, as his surety. (R. at 2.) On 
November 5, 1986, the District Court entered judgment against Defendant 
Papa-Dakis. (R. at 37-38, reproduced infra at A-6.) 
Western Surety still refused to pay the Bakers' claim under its 
bond. On December 4, 1986, the Bakers filed their Motion for Summary 
Judgment against Western Surety. (R. at 43.) Western Surety responded by 
filing an interpleader action in the District Court2 and filing a motion in the 
Bakers' action to stay that action. (R. at 68.) Both motions were heard by 
Judge Wilkinson on December 19, 1986. (R. at 86.) Judge Wilkinson denied 
Western Surety's motion to stay proceedings and granted the Bakers' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (Transcript of 12/19/86 Hearing, R. at 312.) Upon 
2The interpleader action was assigned to the Honorable Richard Moffat, 
whereas the Bakers' action was assigned to the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. 
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the announcement by Judge Wilkinson of his grant of the Bakers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Western Surety's Counsel orally moved to stay execution 
upon that judgment. (Transcript of 12/19/86 Hearing, R. at 325.) Judge 
Wilkinson denied that motion also. (Id.) 
Ten days later, on December 29, 1986, Western Surety paid to the 
Clerk of the District Court the sum of $20,000.00, the amount that it claims3 
represents the total amount of its indebtedness under its bond. (See. Clerk's 
receipt, R. at 182, reproduced infra at A-15.) 
Under pressure from the Utah State Insurance Commissioner (see 
letter dated 1/27/87, reproduced infra at A-16-17), Western Surety filed with 
the Utah Supreme Court a notice of its appeal of the District Court's denial 
of its motion to stay the Bakers' action. (See, Notice of Appeal, 
R. at 153.) Western Surety made clear that it did not appeal the Summary 
Judgment for only the denial of a stay. (Id.) 
Judge Wilkinson having twice denied Western Surety's motion for a 
stay and Western Surety having appealed that denial to the Utah Supreme 
Court, Western Surety then obtained ex parte from the Honorable David B. 
Dee (acting for the Honorable Richard H. Moffat) a Temporary Restraining 
Order enjoining the Bakers from executing upon the judgment that Judge 
Wilkinson had granted them.4 At a hearing held on February 5, 1987, Judge 
3There are numerous claimants with respect to the conduct of Defendant 
Papa-Dakis. Western Surety's claim that its liability is limited to $20,000.00 
for all claims combined is debatable under the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Dennis Dillion Oldsmobile, Inc.t v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557 (Utah 1983). 
4That TRO was improperly obtained in violation of a number of 
provisions, including: Section 78-7-19 of the Utah Code (prohibiting repeated 
applications for the same order); Rule 15.4 of the Rules of Practice; Rule 
5 
Moffat vacated the TRO as having been "wrongfully issued" and denied 
Western Surety's concurrent motion for a preliminary injunction. (Transcript 
of 2/5/87 Hearing at 39, reproduced infra at A-24.) Following the hearing 
before Judge Moffat, counsel for Western Surety and the Bakers agreed to the 
amount and sufficiency of a supersedeas bond to be posted by Western Surety 
pending the resolution of its appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Based upon 
the assurances of counsel for Western Surety that a corporate surety bond 
was being obtained and would be posted, counsel for the Bakers agreed that 
no further efforts at execution would be attempted even before the bond was 
actually posted. (See, Stipulation, R. at 269-70, reproduced infra at A-25.) 
Thereafter, Western Surety filed with Judge Wilkinson in the 
Bakers' action its "Motion for Relief from Judgment or, in the Alternative, to 
Limit Execution to the Interpleaded Funds." (R. at 161-165, reproduced infra 
at A-27.) That motion sought relief under Rule 60(a) and alleged that the 
December, 1986, judgment was Hin error, as the [Bakers'] judgment should be 
limited to a judgment against the bond." (R. at 162-163 and infra at A-28 
through A-29.) The motion also sought relief under Rule 60(b)(1), alleging 
that the December, 1986, judgment did not "accurately reflect the result of 
the summary judgment entered." (R. at 163 and infra at A-29.) Finally, the 
motion sought an order limiting execution "to the bond funds" (R. at 164 and 
infra at A-30.) 
Western Surety's appeal of Judge Wilkinson's December, 1986, 
65A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in that it did not define the 
injury, did not state why the injury was irreparable, and did not state why it 
had been granted without notice); and Rule 65A(c) (in that no security was 
posted). 
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judgment was docketed with the Utah Supreme Court on February 11, 1987. 
Thereafter, Western Surety's motion was argued to Judge Wilkinson on 
February 13, 1987. Judge Wilkinson noted that he had "serious — very 
serious -- question" as to whether he had jurisdiction in view of the fact 
that Western Surety had appealed his original denial of a stay to the Utah 
Supreme Court (Transcript of 2/13/87 Hearing, R. at 280 and 281, reproduced 
infra at A-31 and A-32) but, nevertheless, granted the motion, noting that his 
December, 1986, judgment should "only go against the bond." (Id. at 282.) 
Judge Wilkinson also stated that he felt that the Bakers were "entitled to 
judgment against the amount of the bond of Western Surety or the bond 
itself." (Id at 283-84.) He went on to note that he thought "the judgment 
itself is void" (Id. at 284) and that he was granting the relief pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(5). {Id.) 
On March 26, 1987, the Utah Supreme Court, upon the stipulation 
of the parties and upon the motion of Western Surety, dismissed in its 
entirety Western Surety's appeal from Judge Wilkinson's December, 1986, 
judgment. (See, Order, reproduced infra at A-20.) On April 7, 1987, the 
District Court entered its formal written Order on Western Surety's motion to 
limit execution, the sole effect of which was to grant Western Surety's 
motion to amend the original December 31, 1986, Judgment so as to limit 
Western Surety's liability "to the bond." (R. at 294-96, reproduced infra at 
A-ll.) 
The Bakers appealed to the Utah Supreme Court solely from the 
granting of Western Surety's motion to modify the original judgment so as to 
limit execution "to the bond." (See, Notice of Appeal, R. at 300-01, 
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reproduced infra at A-22.) Western Surety now attempts to cross-appeal the 
District Court's denial (more than four months earlier in December, 1986) of 
its motion for a stay. (R. at 304-05.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court erred in attempting to amend in April of 1987 
the judgment that it had entered in favor of the Bakers against Western 
Surety in December of 1986. Procedurally, the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to order amendment of its December judgment. Jurisdiction must 
be found in Rule 60(a), 60(b), or 59. The District Court lacked jurisdiction 
under Rule 60(a) because Western Surety's appeal of the December, 1986, 
judgment had been docketed with the Utah Supreme Court but no leave had 
been obtained from the Utah Supreme Court for the modification of the 
judgment sought by Western Surety. The trial court attempted to justify the 
relief under Rule 60(b)(5) on the basis that the judgment was "void." Even if 
erroneous, however, the judgment would be merely voidable, not void. 
Moreover, grounds do not exist on the basis of "mistake" under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Finally, the relief that the motion actually sought was an amendment of the 
judgment pursuant to Rule 59; however, any motion under that rule had to be 
filed within ten days and the motion was, therefore, untimely. 
Substantively, there is no merit to Western Surety's contention that 
its liability to the Bakers should be limited Mto its bond.11 A bond is merely a 
civil contract which, in this case, Western Surety breached. There exists no 
justification to limit a defaulting party's liability to the very contract that 
the party has breached. 
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Western Surety's cross-appeal must be dismissed because it is 
barred. Western Surety's cross-appeal relates only to the denial in December 
of 1986 of its motion to stay the proceedings. The order implementing that 
denial was entered December 31, 1986, together with the original Judgment. 
The subsequent amendment, in April of 1986, of the Judgment entered 
concurrently with the denial of Western Surety's motion for a stay does not 
extend the appeal time with respect to that order. Accordingly, Western 
Surety's cross-appeal is untimely even if not barred by the dismissal of its 
prior appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT. 
Any action by the trial court to amend its December, 1986, 
judgment had to fall within the purview of one of three possible rules of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 59, Rule 60(a), or Rule 60(b). As will 
be seen, none of those rules was applicable and the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction. 
A. The Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction Under Rule 60(a). 
Western Surety claims that the trial court was acting under Rule 
60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule5 relates only to 
6The rule is set forth in full in the Addendum, infra at A-3 
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"clerical mistakes in judgments . . . arising from oversight or omission . . . ,M 
and provides that: 
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be 
so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the 
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is 
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate 
court. 
Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, Western Surety's 
appeal of Judge Wilkinson's December, 1986, judgment was docketed on 
February 11, 1987. Leave was never sought of, and leave was never granted 
by, the Utah Supreme Court for any amendment or correction of the record 
or the judgment by the District Court. Accordingly, when the motion of 
Western Surety was heard by Judge Wilkinson on February 13, 1987, Judge 
Wilkinson, as he recognized6, lacked jurisdiction of the case. The language 
of Rule 60(a) is clear. If the correction of clerical errors is to be conducted 
after the filing of an appeal, it must be conducted either before the appeal is 
docketed or with leave of the appellate court. In this case, neither of the 
conditions was met and the District Court lacked jurisdiction to amend its 
December, 1986, judgment. 
Moreover, counsel for Western Surety reviewed the December, 1986, 
judgment prior to its entry and signed that judgment as "approved as to 
form" before it was submitted to Judge Wilkinson for entry. (See, Judgment, 
R. at 100-02, reproduced infra at A-8.) Having previously approved of the 
form of the judgment, it was totally inappropriate for Western Surety to later 
complain about the form of that judgment and allege clerical errors in it. 
eSee Transcript of 2/13/87 Hearing, R. at 280-81, reproduced infra at 
A-31 and A-32. 
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Having approved of the form of the judgment, Western Surety was precluded 
from later claiming "clerical errors/1 
Both because the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the express 
language of Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because its 
counsel had approved of the form of the judgment later claimed to contain 
clerical errors, the District Court erred in attempting to amend the December, 
1986, judgment. 
B. No Grounds Existed for Relief Under Rule 60(b^. 
At the hearing at which he granted Western Surety's motion to 
amend the December, 1986, judgment, Judge Wilkinson stated that he felt the 
original judgment was void. (See, R. at 284, reproduced infra at A-35.) This 
statement manifests a clear misunderstanding of relevant law by the trial 
judge. A judgment which is erroneous may, under some circumstances, be 
voidable, but it is not void. A judgment is void only if it was entered by a 
court not having jurisdiction of the subject matter or in an action in which 
the persons against whom the judgment is signed have not been served or 
otherwise brought within the court's in personam jurisdiction. In this case, it 
is beyond any argument that Western Surety was properly served and that the 
District Courts of this state have jurisdiction in matters of this nature. 
There is simply no merit of any nature whatsoever to Judge Wilkinson's belief 
that the December 31, 1986, judgment resulting from the December 19, 1986, 
hearing, was "void." 
Western Surety also attempts to bring Judge Wilkinson's order 
within the purview of Subsection 1 of Rule 60(b), which relates to "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" as grounds for relief. This 
11 
section also is not applicable to the present circumstances. First, there was 
no evidence offered to support any relief under this ground. There were no 
affidavits filed and there were no witnesses called. Moreover, Western Surety 
had every opportunity to detect and correct any "mistake" in the December, 
1986, judgment; yet, it approved that judgment as to form after several 
changes were made at its request. Having had an opportunity to inspect and 
redraft the judgment and having approved the judgment as to form, Western 
Surety was precluded from later claiming that the judgment contained some 
"mistake." With respect to "inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," no 
evidence was offered and no argument was made to Judge Wilkinson. Those 
concepts are not applicable to the circumstances of this case. 
C. Western Surety's Motion Actually Sought an Amendment of the December, 
1986. Judgment and Was Untimely Under Rule 59. 
The thrust of Western Surety's complaint was with the substance of 
the December, 1986, judgment, rather than its form. The motion that Western 
Surety really argued to the District Court was a Rule 59 motion to alter or 
amend the December judgment. 
In essence, Western Surety's argument was that since the Bakers' 
claim was "on the bond," their judgment should have been "limited to the 
bond." Assuming, arguendo, the legal validity of this argument, it is 
immediately apparent that what is being contended is that an error had 
occurred in the substance of the judgment in that the relief granted was 
erroneous and more generous than should have been allowed. Such a motion 
falls under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Rule 59(e), however, strictly limits the filing of motions under 
Rule 59 to the ten-day period following the entry of the judgment. The 
judgment that Western Surety sought to have amended was entered on 
December 31, 1986. Accordingly, its motion on February 6, 1987, was clearly 
untimely. The District Court erred in failing to deny an untimely Rule 59 
motion. 
POINT IL THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIVE MERIT TO THE CONTENTION 
THAT PLAINTIFFS' JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO 
DEFENDANT'S BOND. 
A fundamental point must be made at the outset: A bond is 
nothing but a civil contract, an agreement by one party to make payment if a 
stated condition occurs or fails to occur. In this case, Western Surety 
entered into a contract by which it agreed to pay up to a stated amount in 
the event that the auto dealer failed to comply with Utah law.7 Western 
Surety received substantial financial compensation for making that promise. 
Accordingly, Western Surety was obligated to honor the Bakers' claim when it 
became apparent that co-Defendant Papa-Dakis had defaulted in his 
obligations to them. Western Surety failed to pay the Bakers, ignoring their 
7Actually, the bond contains two separate and distinct promises by 
Western Surety. First, Western Surety expressly agreed to "indemnify persons 
. . . for loss suffered . . . through the violation of any of the provisions of 
[Utah's] Motor Vehicle Business Act . . . ." Second, Western Surety expressly 
agreed that it would "pay judgments and costs adjudged against [its] principal 
. . . on account of fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or 
violations of said laws . . . .H It additionally agreed that it would Halso pay 
reasonable attorney's fees in cases successfully prosecuted to judgment.M The 
bond is reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-14. 
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claim. Once judgment was entered against co-Defendant Papa-Dakis on 
November 5, 1986 (R. at 37-38, reproduced infra at A-6), Western Surety was 
expressly obligated under the provisions of its bond to pay that judgment. 
Western Surety still refused to pay. Western Surety was, therefore, in breach 
of its contract. 
On December 4, 1986, the Bakers filed their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. at 43.) On December 19, 1986, Judge Wilkinson determined 
that their existed no genuine dispute as to any fact material to the 
determination of the motion for summary judgment and granted the Bakers 
Summary Judgment based upon those undisputed facts (R. at 325). Nothing 
contained in the motion, nothing contained in Western Surety's response, and 
nothing contained in the arguments of counsel before Judge Wilkinson can be 
said to stand for the proposition that the motion was anything but a routine 
motion for summary judgment based upon a contractual obligation that had 
clearly been breached by Western Surety. The court agreed and granted 
Summary Judgment. 
Under such circumstances, Western Surety simply breached its 
contractual obligations to the Bakers. Having breached those obligations, 
there exists no justification for limiting the Bakers' recovery upon their 
judgment "to the bond." The "bondH is, after all, nothing but a civil 
contract, which has, in this case, been breached by Western Surety. It makes 
no more sense in this case for Western Surety to argue that its liability or 
that the Bakers* execution, should be limited "to the bond funds" than it 
would in any other contract case to say that the Plaintiff, who has recovered 
judgment based upon the Defendant's breach of contract, must look solely to 
14 
the breached contract for recovery. Had Western Surety chosen to comply 
with its contractual obligation under the bond, then its liability to the 
Plaintiffs would undoubtedly have been limited in accordance with the terms 
of the bond. However, Western Surety, for whatever reason, chose to 
disregard its obligations under the bond, chose to refuse to pay the Bakers' 
claim, and cannot now insist that the Court limit its liability to the very 
contractual document that it breached. 
Significantly, Western Surety cited not a single case to the District 
court in which a court had "limited execution to the bond." While the phrase 
has a certain equitable ring about it, there is no legal support for the 
concept. 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court may 
not indefinitely stay execution upon its judgment, which is precisely the relief 
that Western Surety obtained from the District Court in this case. For 
example, in Taylor National Inc., v. Jensen Brothers Construction* 
641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court reversed an attempt by the 
trial court to limit execution upon its judgment, noting: 
Having found that a valid contract existed and that 
[Plaintiff] had performed its part of that contract, the 
Court correctly granted judgment to [Plaintiff] on the 
contract. 
While the trial court was correct in awarding 
judgment to [Plaintiff] it erred in permanently staying 
execution of that judgment against [one of the 
defendants]. A party receiving a judgment is entitled to 
have that judgment enforced by the granting court. 
That court, in its discretion, may temporarily stay 
15 
execution in order to prevent injustice, but it may not 
negate its own judgment by indefinitely staying execution 
thereon. 
641 P.2d at 153-54 (emphasis added, footnote citations omitted). Similarly, in 
Ketchum Cole v. Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 Pac. 541 (1916), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that there is "no discretion . . . vested in the court 
whether it will enforce" its judgments. Simply stated, the District Court did 
not have the discretion to grant the relief sought by Western Surety under 
the facts of this case. 
It should be noted that the dilemma that Western Surety perceives 
itself to be faced with is entirely of its own making. Western Surety's 
concern is that there are numerous individuals who were defrauded by 
Western Surety's principal. The Bakers, however, perfected their claim under 
the bond by giving notice and making their claim. They then proceeded to 
file suit against the auto dealer and recover judgment against the dealer. 
They then moved for summary judgment against Western Surety. At that 
point, rather than honoring their claim, Western Surety filed an interpleader 
action naming the Bakers and several other claimants as E>efendants. 
However, that action was not served on the Bakers and no funds were 
actually deposited by Western Surety with respect to the interpleader action 
until long after Judge Wilkinson had granted Summary Judgment against 
Western Surety on December 19, 1986. Having been told on December 19, 
1986, by Judge Wilkinson that he was granting Summary Judgment in favor of 
the Bakers, Western Surety elected to voluntarily pay the $20,000.00 that it 
16 
claims to be the maximum amount due under its bond8 to the Clerk of the 
District Court in the interpleader action on December 29, 1986, rather than 
using those funds to satisfy the Bakers' claims and judgment against Western 
Surety. Having voluntarily elected to place those funds beyond the reach of 
the Bakers, Western Surety now fears that unless the Bakers' execution is 
limited to those funds, Western Surety may possibly be faced with a "double 
liability." Western Surety should not, however, be permitted to foist upon the 
Bakers the burden of the quandary that it created for itself by voluntarily 
paying funds to the interpleader action rather than using those funds to 
satisfy the judgment that had already been rendered against it in favor of the 
Bakers. 
POINT III. WESTERN SURETY'S CROSS-APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED. 
A. The Cross-Appeal Is Barred by the Prior Dismissal of Western Surety's 
Appeal. 
On January 29, 1987, Western Surety appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court from the District Court's denial of its motion to stay proceedings. 
(Notice of Appeal, R. at 153-54, reproduced infra at A-18.) Pursuant to a 
stipulation of the parties and upon the motion of Western Surety, that appeal 
was dismissed by the Utah Supreme Court on March 26, 1987. (See, Order of 
Dismissal reproduced infra at A-20.) The unqualified dismissal by Western 
%See% f .n. 3, supra. 
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Surety of its appeal constitutes an abandonment of that appeal and results in 
what amounts to an affirmance of the order from which the appeal was taken. 
Having once dismissed its appeal from the District Court's refusal 
to grant its motion to stay proceedings, Western Surety cannot now, more 
than five months later, reinstate its appeal. Western Surety's option was to 
pursue its appeal or abandon its appeal — it chose the latter. Having 
abandoned its appeal, and that appeal having been dismissed by the Utah 
Supreme Court, Western Surety cannot now resurrect the appeal. 
B. Western Surety's Cross-Appeal is Untimely, 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that an 
appeal be filed within thirty days of the entry of the challenged order. 
In this case, the District Court denied from the bench on December 
19, 1986, Western Surety's motion to stay the proceedings and the written 
Order was signed and entered on December 13, 1986 (R. at 100, reproduced 
infra at A-8). The April 7, 1987, order resulting from Western Surety's 
motion to the District Court to limit execution Hto the bond" did not in any 
way alter, amend, or change the District Court's denial in December of 1986 
of Western Surety's motion to stay the proceedings. Likewise, the motion to 
limit execution Hto the bond" did not seek either expressly or by implication 
any amendment or modification of the District Court's December, 1986, denial 
of Western Surety's motion to stay the proceedings. Finally, Western Surety's 
acknowledgement that the Order and Judgment dated December 31, 1986, was 
a final and appealable order is manifest most clearly by its own appeal of 
that Order to the Utah Supreme Court. 
18 
The mere fact that the District Court's April 7, 1987, Order 
granting Western Surety's motion to limit execution "to the bond" stated that 
the original December 31, 1986, order granting summary judgment was so 
amended and then reiterated the original order in full, including the 
paragraph denying Western Surety's motion to stay proceedings, does not 
revive the time for Western Surety to appeal from the denial of its motion. 
Had the District Court in December of 1986 entered two separate orders on 
two separate pieces of paper, the untimeliness of Western Surety's cross-
appeal would be obvious. Likewise, had the District Court's April 7, 1987, 
order merely stated that the original December 31, 1986, judgment was 
amended so as to limit execution "to the bond," it would be obvious that 
Western Surety's purported cross-appeal is untimely. Neither the fact that 
the denial of a separate motion to stay proceedings was included on the same 
piece of paper in December of 1986 as the judgment nor the fact that the 
written order in April of 1987 amending the judgment reiterated, for clarity, 
the entire operative language of the December, 1986, order and judgment 
serves to alter the substantive rights of the parties or extend the appeal 
time. 
Western Surety's purported cross-appeal is untimely and this Court 
lacks jurisdiction of it. 
CONCLUSION 
Procedurally, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to amend in 
April of 1987 its judgment previously entered in December of 1986. The 
District Court had no jurisdiction to correct "clerical mistakes" because 
19 
Western Surety's appeal from the December, 1986, judgment had been 
docketed with the Utah Supreme Court and no leave for such correction had 
befen applied for or received from the Utah Supreme Court. The relief sought 
by Western Surety did not fall within the purview of Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure because the judgment was not "void" pursuant to 
Subsection 5 and no HmistakeH of the nature contemplated by Subsection 1 had 
occurred. The relief that the motion actually sought was a substantive 
amendment of the judgment pursuant to Rule 59; however, the motion was 
grossly untimely under that rule. 
Substantively, there existed no reason or justification to limit the 
Bakers' judgment "to the bond." A bond is merely a civil contract and in 
this case Western Surety had breached its contract with the Bakers. 
Therefore, it is not appropriate to limit the Bakers' recovery to the contract 
that Western Surety had breached. 
Western Surety's cross-appeal is barred by the prior dismissal of 
the very same appeal by the Utah Supreme Court and because the cross-
appeal, which relates only to the denial in December of 1986 of Western 
Surety's motion for a stay, is untimely. 
Accordingly, the District Court's order purporting to amend the 
December, 1986, judgment must be vacated and Western Surety's cross-appeal 
dismissed. Additionally, the matter should be remanded to the District Court 
for the determination and assessment of the reasonable attorney's fees 
20 
incurred by the Bakers on this appeal, for which Western Surety is 
responsible pursuant to the terms of its bond. 
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence coilld not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
A-2 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendanthas 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
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Rule 4. Appeal as of right: When taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the district court to the Supreme Court, 
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or order is entered in a 
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal re-
quired by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10 
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: (1) for 
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: 
(1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after 
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal 
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
DII which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
f (e) Extension of time to appeal. The district court, upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the 
time prescribed by Paragraph (a j of this rule. Any such motion which is filed 
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district 
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expira-
tion of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance 
with the district court rules of practice. No extension shall exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the 
motion, whichever occurs later. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
July 8, 1987 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
John D. Parken 
Marcel 3 a L Keck 
Attorneys at Law 
Suite 1330 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
George M Baker and Delia M 
Baker, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
u , Wo. 870193 
Western Surety Company; Craig 
A. Papa-Dakls, individually and 
d/b/a "Auto-Mart;" and Auto-Mart, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Pursuant to the the authority uested in this Court, this case 
is transferred to the Court of Appeals for disposition. All further 
pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that Court. Their 
address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, CRAIG 
A. PAPA-DAKIS, individually and 
d/b/a "AUTO-MART;" and AUTO-
MART, 
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT 
Civil No. C86-7427 




Defendant in this action, Craig A. Papa-Dakis, 
individually and d/b/a "Auto-Mart," having been regularly 
served with process, but having failed to appear and answer or 
otherwise plead to the complaint on file herein; the legal time 
for answers having expired; and the Default of said defendant 
having been duly entered according to law; now, upon the motion 
of plaintiff, judgment is hereby entered against defendant pur-
suant to the prayer of the plaintiff's complaint and it is hereby 
1 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff recover 
from Defendants Craig A. Papa-Dakis d/b/a "Auto-Mart" and Auto 
Mart the sum of $14,780.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 
ten (10) percent per annum and after March 18, 1986, until the 
date hereof, in the amount of $935.39, and costs in the amount of 
$84.75 for a total of $15,800.14 together with interest at the 
rate of twelve (12%) per annum from and after the date herof 
until paid. 
DATED this day of November, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
H O W O H * " * * 
\J.'-J°->l-> 
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WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; CRAIG 
A. PAPA-DAKIS, individually 
and d/b/a "AUTO-MART;11 and 
AUTO-MART, 
Defendants. 
ORDER and SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-7427 
The Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson 
oooOooo 
Plaintiffs1 Motion to Determine Admissions and Motion 
for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, 
at approximately 9:00 o'clock a.m. on Friday, December 19, 1986, 
together with Defendant Western Surety Company's Motion to Stay 
Proceedings; Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, John 
D. Parken; Defendant Western Surety Company was represented by 
its counsel, Mark D. Dunn; the default of Defendants Craig A. 
°^oioo 
Papa-Dakis and Auto-Mart having heretofore been entered by this 
Court, no appearance was entered by or on behalf of Defendants 
Papa-Dakis and Auto-Mart; the Court having heard the arguments of 
counsel, having reviewed the files and records herein, including 
the Affidavits of George Baker and John Braithwaite; Plaintiffs1 
counsel having represented that he was not relying in support of 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment upon any constructive 
admissions; the Court being fully advised in the premises; and 
good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant Western Surety Company's motion for a 
stay is denied; and 
2. No genuine dispute exists as to any fact material 
to the determination of Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and that motion is hereby granted; and it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs be, and 
they are hereby, granted judgment against Defendant Western 
Surety Company in the amount of $15,800.14, together with 
interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from and 
after the date hereof, and together also with Plaintiffs1 
2 
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costs incurred in this action but with each party to bear their 
own counsel fees. 
DATED this O ' day of December, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
ZoYiri N. Braithwaite 
Counsel for Defendant 
Western Surety 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
District Judge 
ATTEST 
H. QIXON HINDLEY 
ay 
Deputy Ctork 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of December, 
1986, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and 
Judgment to be hand-delivered to John N. Braithwaite, Esq., 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith, 175 South West Temple Suite 650, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
3 
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John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
LED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
Deputy' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. BAKER and 
DELLA A. BAKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART, 
an unregistered fictitious name, 
Defendants. 
' tbk. St\3 N\o 3^3 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-7427 
The Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
The Motion of Western Surety Company For Relief From 
Judgment or, in the alternative, To Limit Execution to the 
Interpleaded Funds came on regularly for hearing before this 
Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, on Friday, 
February 13, 1987, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Western Surety 
Company appearing by and through its counsel, John N. 
Braithwaite, plaintiffs appearing by and through their counsel, 
John D. Parken, the Court having reviewed the pleadings on file 
# 
herein, having reviewed the memoranda supporting and opposing 
said motion, having heard and considered the arguments and the 
representations of counsel, being fully advised in the premises, 
and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of Western Surety 
Company for relief from judgment is granted pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the reason that 
the Order and Summary Judgment previously signed and entered by 
this Court on December 31, 1986 was entered by mistake and is 
incorrect, and for the reason that said Order and Summary 
Judgment is otherwise void. Relief from judgment is accordingly 
granted and the Order and Summary Judgment previously entered is 
modified and corrected pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, so as to be entered in its entirety as 
follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Western Surety Company's 
motion to stay proceedings is denied; and it is hereby 
FURTHER ORDERED that no genuine dispute exists as to any 
fact material to the determination of plaintiffs1 motion for 
summary judgment and plaintiffs are granted summary judgment 
against Western Surety Company's bond in the amount of 
$15,800.14, together with interest at the rate of twelve (12) per 
cent per annum from and after December 31, 1986, and together 
with plaintiffs1 costs incurred in this action, but with each 
-2-
party to bear their own counsel fees, and it is is hereby 
FURTHER ORDERED that the summary judgment awarded to the 
plaintiffs is against the bond only, that the plaintiffs are only 
entitled to relief against the bond funds, which funds are 
deposited in the registry of the Court in the interpleader 
action, and that the plaintiffs' relief against the bond funds is 
limited as determined by the Court in the interpleader action 
filed on December 16, 1986, Civil No. C86-9295; and it is hereby 
FURTHER ORDERED that Western Surety Company's liability 
is limited to the bond. 
DATED thi s 7 day of ^-p^^ , 1987. 
ATTEST 
BY THE COURT: 
-Tv 
he Honorable HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Third District Court Judge 
PPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ohn v. Pax 
ttornfcy fo aintiffs 
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BOND NO 5816l^bl 
B O N D OF MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER, SALESMAN OR CRUSHER 
KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS That we. C r a i g A . P a p a - D a k i s A u t o H a r t 
of 
Street Address 2 5 4 0 S o u t h Main S t r e e t
 C i t y S a l t Lake C i t y 
County"' S a l t L a k e Utah, as Principal and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY 
a Surety Company qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah as Surety are jointly and severally held and 
firmly bound to the people of the State of Utah to indemnify persons, firms and corporations for loss suffered by reason of 
violation of the conditions hereinafter contained, in the total aggregate annual penal sum of T w e n t y T h o u s a n d a n d 
Dollars (S 20 , 00CH as required by Utah Code Ann §41-3-16(1). (1953, as amended) lawful money of the United States foPc 
the payment of which well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and 
assigns, jointly, severally and firmly by these presents The total aggregate annual liability of this bond, regardless of the 
number of claims, may not exceed < 2 0 . 0 0 0 « 0 0 
THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION IS SUCH. That, 
WHEREAS, the above bounden principal has applied for a license to do business as a 
Motor v/fthtrift D e a l e r within the State of Utah, and that pursuant to the application, a license has 
been or is about to be issued 
NOW. THEREFORE, if the above bounden pr incipal shall obtain said license to do business as such 
Motor Vehicle T)pa1 pr and shall well and truly observe and comply 
with all requirements and provisions of THE ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REGULATION AND CONTROL OF THE 
BUSINESS OF DEALING IN MOTOR VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 3, Title 41. Utah Code Ann (1953. as amended), 
and indemnify persons, firms and corporations in accordance with Utah Code Ann § 41-3-16(1), (1953, as amended), for loss 
suffered by reason of the fraud or fraudulent representations made or through the violation of any of the provisions of said 
Motor Vehicle Business Act or any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles, or rule or regulation respecting commerce in 
motor vehicles promulgated by a licensing or regulating authority and shall pay judgments and costs adjudged against said 
principal so as not to exceed a total aggregate annual liability of S *® tOOO . 0 0 regardless of the number 
of claims on this bond on account of fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or violations of said laws, rules or 
regulations during the time of said license and all lawful renewals thereof, then the above obligation shall be null and void, 
otherwise to remain in full force and effect Said bounden principal shall also pay reasonable attorney s fees in cases 
successfully prosecuted to judgment. 
The Surety herein reserves the right to withdraw as such surety except as to any liability already incurred or accrued 
hereunder and may do so upon the giving of written notice of such withdrawal to the principal and to the Motor Vehicle 
Business Administrator, provided, however, that no withdrawal shall be effective for any purpose until sixty days shall have 
elapsed from and after the receipt of such notice by the said administrator, and further provided that no withdrawal shall in 
anywise affect the liability of said surety arising out oi fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or violations of 
said laws. ru«e3 or regulation by the principal hereunder prior to the expiration of such period of sixty days, regardless of 
whether or not the loss suffered has been reduced to judgment before the «apse of sixty days 
Signed and sealed this _ 4 t h day of F e b r u a r y , 19 8 6 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS AUTO MART / / S -
Principal 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY 
~>5 ($UTZ 
Approved 33 to form 
Office of the Utah Atta TOXT1, I) J\liOfid) 
BY. . \ K. f > * -
Attorney-i/f-Fact 
I COPY \ 
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NORMAN H. BANGERTER 
Governor 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Western Surety Company 
101 South Phillips Avenue 
Sioux Falls, SD 57192 
Attention: Joe Patrick Kirby, President 
RE: Our File No. 22101 
Dear Mr. Kirby: 
On January 13, 1987 the above referred to file was opened pursuant 
to a complaint filed with the Department alleging that Western 
Surety has failed to satisfy an existing judgment entered in the 
Third District Court in the State of Utah, Salt Lake County (Civil 
No. C86-7427). The complaint was forwarded to Western Surety 
Company on or about January 16, 1987 and we are awaiting the 
company's response. However, an additional matter has come to the 
attention of the Commissioner which causes this correspondence to 
be forwarded to you. 
The judgment at issue in this matter was entered on December 30, 
1986. It was the understanding of counsel for the plaintiff in 
those proceedings that Western Surety would not voluntarily pay 
the judgment. While we understand that Western Surety has the 
right of appeal, it was also the understanding of plaintiff's 
counsel that Western Surety would not appeal. Accordingly, if 
that is the fact, then Western Surety is obliged to satisfy the 
judgment. 
The Commissioner views this matter with much concern. Because of 
the position taken by Western Surety, through its counsel in Salt 
Lake City, plaintiff has been forced to seek the enforcement and 
satisfaction of the judgment through a massive garnishment of 
Western Surety Company agents doing business in this state. The 
garnishment has been issued to approximately twenty (20) agents 
and will continue until the judgment is satisfied. We have 
received complaints from agents, who were not parties to the 
lawsuit, concerning the garnishment of their trust account funds. 
STATE OF UTAH 
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT HAROLD C. YANCEY 
Insurance Commissioner 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45803 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Phone: (801)530-6400 
January 27, 1987 
A-16 
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It is the position of the Commissioner that Western Surety must 
satisfy the judgment and not allow the continued garnishment of 
its agents in this state. We view the matter of the outstanding 
garnishment procedures to be totally unnecessary. Furthermore, 
Utah insureds may be placed in a perilous position under the 
garnishment of funds intended as premium for coverage. 
Under the Utah Insurance Code, Section 31A-2-308(ll), the 
Commissioner may revoke the Certificate of Authority of any 
licensee whose methods and practices he finds would endanger the 
legitimate interest of customers and the public. In light of that 
provision, the conduct of Western Surety in failing to satisfy an 
outstanding judgment would, in the opinion of the Commissioner, 
place the Certificate of Authority of the company in jeopardy in 
this state. The Commissioner cannot find good cause, under these 
facts, for Western Surety to allow a garnishment of its agents, 
which may jeopardize policyholders as well as the legitimate 
interests of the public. Subject to Western Surety's right of 
appeal of the judgment that is currently outstanding, the 
Commissioner demands that Western Surety honor the judgment and 
satisfy it in full. Should the company decide not to appeal the 
judgment and not satisfy it, the Commissioner will file a Notice 
of Hearing and Order to Show Cause and consider all appropriate 
penalties in enforcement of the Insurance Code. 
Your cooperation in attendance to this matter is greatly 
appreciated. The Commissioner expects the written response of 
Western Surety within ten (10) days of receipt of this 
correspondence. 
Sincerely, 
HAROLD C. YANCEY, CPCU 
Insurance Commissioner 
Kendall R. Surfass / 
Market Conduct Sta^x Counsel 
KRS:lm 
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A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. BAKER and 
DELLA A. BAKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART, 
an unregistered fictitious name, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. C86-7427 
The Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
Western Surety Company, by and through its counsel, 
hereby gives notice of its appeal from a part of that certain 
order entered on December 31, 1986 by the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County in the above entitled action. 
The part of the order appealed from is the order denying Western 
Surety Companyfs motion to stay proceedings, which denial allowed 
the subsequent grant of summary judgment exposing Western Surety 
Company to multiple liability. This appeal seeks a reversal of 
OJG153 
the denial of the motion to stay proceedings and accordingly, 
seeks the vacation of the summary judgment entered subsequent to 
the denial of the motion to stay proceedings. This appeal is 
taken to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
DATED this 2*?^ day of January, 1987. 
HANSON, DONN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
^ ^/M7M<^{L JOJflTN. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, this U^ clay of 
T/t/iotiry r 1987, to the following: 
John D. Parken 
Marcella L. Keck 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, OT 84101 
Craig A. Papa-Dakis 
1630 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
9/86-600D.14 
(Itffcn $> DA^iM^jt/ 
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John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. BAKER and 
DELLA A. BAKER, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART11; and AUTO-MART, 
an unregistered fictitious name. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 870059 
District Court 
Civil No. C86-7427 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties and the motion 
of the appellant Western Surety Company for the dismissal of this 
appeal, and pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, 




day of March, 1987. 
BY TBE SUPREME COURT: 
r 
CERTIFICATE OF SEKVTGB 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 
day of /fyw-ok , 1987, to the following: 
John D. Parken 
Marce11a L. Keck 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
1/86-743M.1 
4^vT ''• JjJsf/tZ^rjE 
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John D. Parken (2518) 
Marcella L. Keck (4063) 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
Suite 1330 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFIOf 
SALT U K t COUNT*. UfU l 






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; CRAIG 
A. PAPA-DAKIS, individually 
and d/b/a "AUTO-MART;" and 
AUTO-MART, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C86-7427 
The Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson 
oooOooo 
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, John D. 
Parken, hereby appeal, to the Utah Supreme Court, from the Order 
of the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson granting Defendant Western 
Surety Company's Motion, in the Alternative, for Relief from 
Judgment or to Limit Execution and amending the Judgment 
previously entered by the District Court on December 31, 1986. 
v t 
.i 
This appeal is only from the Order, signed April 7, 1987, and not 
from the original Judgment, signed December 31, 1986. 




I hereby certify that on the 4 ILING day of April, 1987, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal 
to be mailed, postage prepaid to the following: 
John N. Braithwaite, Esq. 
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith 
175 South West Temple Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^ y 
THE COURT: That should be resolved by Judge 
Wilkinson now, not by me. 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: The motion against Western 
Surety upon the bond liability, pursuant to the statute, 
31-4-18, only upon the bond. 
THE COURT: That question I think, Mr. Braithwait^ 
you have got to approach with Judge Wilkinson. That's his 
law suit. He tried that case. You're asking me now to 
make a ruling about whether that judgment can be executed [ 
could be satisfied and that is not in this case. It proper4 
-ly shouldn't be a part of this case. That should be a partj 
of the case with Judge Wilkinson;so I frankly think that to 
the extent—well, I frankly think the order was wrongfully 
issued and I am going to dissolve the temporary restraining 
order. 
Now, that does not make any ruling and not intended 
to be a ruling as to whether or not the Baker judgment has 
priority against this fund,• but I am not going to, in this 
action, stay the execution of that judgment and if they want] 
to go try and execute anyplace they want to, such defenses 
as may be available to those executions can be raised;but 
they'll have to be raised in that case. 
Now, if they execute against the fund here, that will) 
clearly raise the question of the priority that we're drivirjg 
at here. But everybody is entitled to be heard on that, not 
just the people who are here today. So that in the event tqe 
execution is made as aginst the County Attorney's Office 
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HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. BAKER and 
DELLA A. BAKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART, 
an unregistered fictitious name, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
TO APPROVE SUPERSEDEAS 
BOND 
Civil No. C86-7427 
The Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
STIPULATION 
Western Surety Company, by and through its counsel, John 
N. Braithwaite, and George M. and Delia A. Baker, by and through 
their counsel, John D. Parken, hereby stipulate and agree as 
follows: 
1. That Western Surety Company may post a supersedeas 
bond in the amount of $18,000, pursuant to Rule 62 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and pursuant to the appeal taken by 
Western Surety Company. 
4(* Cl 
2. That pursuant to Rule 62(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a stay of execution or other proceedings to 
enforce the judgment entered in this matter will be in effect 
upon the approval by the Court of the supersedeas bond 
stipulated. 
3. That despite the existence of the stay, George M. 
and Delia A. Baker shall be entitled to participate in the 
interpleader action currently pending before this Court in the 
matter styled Western Surety Company v. Robert Benson, et al., 
Civil No. C86-9295, wherein the motor vehicle dealer bond funds 
that are the subject matter of this action have been deposited. 
4. That despite the existence of the stay, George M. 
and Delia A. Baker shall be entitled to seek satisfaction of the 
judgment entered in this action by participating in the 
interpleader action and by executing upon their judgment within 
the interpleader action. Civil No. C86-9295, to the extent deemed 
appropriate by the Court. 
DATED this /2& day of February, 1987. 
Qf4^ V- &4/tM^#iis 
JOBft'N. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorney for Western Surety Co. 
DATED thi A is *y day of 
eorge & Delia Baker 
-2-
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John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
A Professional Corporation 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
m Fn ut CLERK'S OFFICE 
Fa I 4u8PH,87 
BT z%^r/; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. BAKER and 
DELLA A. BAKER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; 
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS, 
individually and d/b/a 
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART, 
an unregistered fictitious name, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, TO LIMIT 
EXECUTION TO THE 
INTERPLEADED FUNDS 
Civil No. C86-7427 
The Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
Western Surety Company hereby moves the above entitled 
Court to correct the judgment entered in this matter on December 
31, 1986, pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure or, in the alternative, to modify the judgment enteredf 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
grounds for this motion are as follows: 
(1) Judgment was entered by this Court on December 31, 
1986 on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against 
Western Surety Company on its motor vehicle dealer's bond. 
G00161 
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(2) Prior to the entry of the judgment and prior to the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment held on December 19 , 
1986, Western Surety Company filed a complaint for interpleader 
on December 16f 1986, interpleading the bond amount and the 
numerous claimants to the bond in the matter styled Western 
Surety Company v. Robert Benson, et al., Civil No. C86-9295. 
(3) By the filing of the interpleader action, 
interpleader jurisdiction was established over the $20,000 bond 
held by Western Surety Company. 
(4) The plaintiffs in this matter are now attempting to 
execute upon their judgment against the assets of Western Surety 
Company generally, rather than against the bond funds held in the 
interpleader action. 
(5) Western Surety Company's liability is limited to 
the $20,000 bond on an aggregate annual basisf regardless of the 
number of claimsf and the plaintiffs must satisfy their judgment 
against the bond funds. 
(6) The plaintiffs claim that their judgment entitles 
them to execute upon the assets of Western Surety Company 
generally, and that they are not required to satisfy their 
judgment out of the bond funds. 
(7) To the extent that the Order entered by this Court 
allows the plaintiffs to execute upon Western Surety Company 
assets generally to satisfy their judgment, the Order is in 
error, as the plaintifffs judgment should be limited to a 
judgment against the bond. This Court may, pursuant to Rule 
60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, correct errors in 
judgments and orders arising from oversight or omission on the 
motion of any party. The only right of action that the 
plaintiffs had against Western Surety Company was upon the bond, 
pursuant to Otah Code Ann. §41-3-18. Western Surety Company*s 
liability arises only by reason of the bond, and the plaintiffs1 
notion for summary judgment was based upon and against the bond. 
Accordingly, the judgment should be corrected to reflect that the 
judgment is against Western Surety Company^ bond and must be 
satisfied out of that bond. 
(8) Alternatively, this Court may, pursuant to Rule 
50(b), modify the judgment entered to accurately reflect the 
result of its judgment. Specifically, subdivision (1) provides 
Eor relief from orders or judgments for reasons of mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. To the extent that 
the Order entered by this Court allows the plaintiffs to execute 
jpon Western Surety Company assets generally to satisfy their 
judgment, the Order does not accurately reflect the result of the 
summary judgment entered. The only cause of action the 
plaintiffs had against Western Surety Company was against the 
Dond, pursuant to U.C.A. §41-3-18. Western Surety Company's 
Liability arises only by reason of the bond and its liability is 
000163 
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limited by the bond. Accordingly, the judgment entered should be 
modified to accurately reflect the result of the summary 
judgment. 
Alternatively, Western Surety moves this Court for an 
Order limiting execution upon the judgment entered in this action 
on December 31, 1986 to the bond funds being held in the 
interpleader action currently pending in the matter styled 
Western Surety Company v. Robert Benson, et al., Civil No. 
C86-9295. The grounds for this motion are set forth in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^^ day of February, 1987. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 




2 * * * 
3 THE C O U R T : F i r s t o f a l l l e t me s t a t e t h i s . 
4
 I n r e a d i n g y o u r m e m o r a n d u m s I was c o n c e r n e d t h a t I d o n ' t 
5 e v e n know i f I h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s m a t t e r b u t I am 
6 g o i n g t o r u l e a n d I s t i l l t h i n k t h e r e ' s a s e r i o u s 
7 q u e s t i o n . I know t h e r e ' s a s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n a n d w h e t h e r 
8 I h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n w i t h t h a t A p p e a l up t h e r e , o f c o u r s e 
9
 t h e y c a n g r a n t me t h e r i g h t t o m a k e i t , b u t I t h i n k 
10
 r i g h t now t h e c a s e i s r e a l l y i n t h e i r h a n d s . G o , I 
11
 t h i n k t h e r e ' s a v e r y s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n t h e r e . 
12 MR. B R A I T H W A I T E : May I make one c o m m e n t , Y o u r 
13 H o n o r . A p h o n e c a l l y e s t e r d a y a f t e r n o o n t o t h e S u p r e m e 
14 C o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h i s was n o t d o c k e t e d y e t . 
15 THE C O U R T : T h a t m i g h t b e . I d o n ' t w a n t t o 
16 g e t on t h a t . A l l I know w h a t y o u s a i d i n y o u r me m o r a n -
17 d u m , y o u s a i d i t ' s on a p p e a l t o t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t . 
18 MR, PARKEN: I w a n t t h e r e c o r d t o be a b s o l u t e -
19 l y c l e a r o n t h a t p o i n t , Y o u r H o n o r . I t h i n k i t ' s 
20 j u r i s d i c t i o n a l . T h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s r e c o r d s , a n d I 
21 c h e c k e d w i t h t h e m t h i s m o r n i n g , i n c i c a t e t h a t M r . 
22 B r a i t h w a i t e ' s a p p e a l i n t h i s c a s e was d o c k e t e d i n t h e 
23 U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t e n F e b r u a r y 1 1 t h u n d e r C a s e 
24 N o . 3 7 3 0 5 9 . 
25 THE COURT: O k a y . W e l l , t h e r e y o u a r e . 
3 
1 MR, BRAITHWAITE. I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t t a k e s 
2 j u r i s d i c t i o n away f rom R u l e 5 0 ( b ) , Y o u r h o n o r , t h a t f s 
3 o n l y in Rule 5 0 ( a ) . 
4
 THE COURT: W e l l , t h i s may be a n o t h e r n a t t e r 
5 y o u ' r e t o be c o n t e s t i n g , I d o n ' t k n o w , b u r I h a v e a 
6 s e r i o u s - - v e r y s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n , I ' l l r e s t a t e i t , 
7 w h e t h e r I h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
8 Now, g o i n g back t o t h e f i r s t s i t u a t i o n of when 
9 t h i s was b e f o r e me of c o u r s e on t h e Summary J u d g m e n t , 
io and I d o n ' t r emember e x a c t l y wha t was p r e s e n t e d t o ma a t 
n t h a t t i m e . I do r emember y o u r b e i n g i n h e r e and I do 
12 r e m e m b e r g r a n t i n g t h e j u d g m e n t . I d o n ' t r e m e m b e r 
n s p e c i f i c a l l y w h e t h e r you s a i d , a n d I ' m n o t s a y i n g you 
14 d i d n ' t , w h e t h e r you s a i d t h e r e was - - t h e i n t e r p l e a d e r 
15 a c t i o n h a d b e e n f i l e d . I do r e m e m b e r some s t a t e m e n t 
16 b e i n g made t h a t t h e b o n d i n g company w a s n ' t s u f f i c i e n t l y 
17 s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e y h a a l i a b i l i t y a t t h a t p o i n t . 
18 S o m e t h i n g t o t h a t e f f e c t . 
19 Now, o t h e r t h a n t h a t I d o n ' t r e m e m b e r much 
20 a b o u t i t . T h a t was one of t h e t h i n g s t h a t I f e l t t h a t 
21 t h e p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e i r c a s e . 
22 I f t h e I n t e r p l e a d e r A c t i o n h a d b e e n p e r f e c t e d i n a l l 
23 p r o b a b i l i t y I would have g r a n t e d a s t a y t h e r e . I d o n ' t 
24 know. I maybe w a n t e d t o l ook a t t h e law on i t . 
25 H R . B R A I T H W A I T E : I f Y o u r Honor w o u l d r e v i e w 
4 
^ 
1 t h e m e m o r a n d a on file for that Motion I think you will 
2 s e e that it was --
3 THE C O U R T : I k n o w w h a t y o u ' r e s a y i n g . I ' m 
* s a y i n g t h a t I d i d g r a n t t h e Summary J u d g m e n t b e c a u s e o f 
5 t h e f a c t t h a t t n e y w e r e t h e r e . T h e y w e r e b e f o r e t h e 
6
 C o u r t . T h e y h a d come i n . T h e y h a d t n e i r a c t i o n f i l e d , 
7
 p e r f e c t e d a n d t h a t e v e n i f t h e I n t e r p l e a d e r A c t i o n h a d 
8 b e e n f i l e d , w h i c h I d o n ' t r e m e m b e r i f I k n e w o r d i d n ' t 
9
 k n o w t h a t i t was c e r t a i n l y f i l e d j u s t f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f 
10
 g r a n t i n g t h e s t a y a n d s t i l l t h e b o n d i n g c o m p a n y w a s 
11
 q u e s t i o n i n g w h e t h e r t h o y h a d l i a b i l i t y i n t h i s s i t u a -
12 t i o n . Bu t I an o f t h e o p i n i o n , and I w o u l d so r u l e , 
13 t h a t t n e j u d g m e n t a w a r d e d t o t h e p l a i n t i f f a g a i n s t 
14 W e s t e r n S u r e t y w o u l d o n l y g o t o a g a i n s t t h e b o n d . 
15 W e s t e r n S u r e t y i s n o t l i a b l e f o r m o r e money t h a n w h a t 
16 t h e y h a v e c o n t r a c t e d t o p a y o u t a n d t h a t ' s t h e b o n d 
17 a m o u n t . When t h e y p a i d t h i s i n t o C o u r t u n d e r I n t e r -
18 p l e a d e r A c t i o n , o f c o u r s e t h a t ' s w h a t y o u ' r e o n t h e 
19 S u p r e m e C o u r t , w h e t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f c a n - - a r e e n t i t l e d 
20 t o t h a t m o n e y f i r s t s i n c e t h e y ' v e g o t t h e i r j u d g m e n t 
21 a n d w h e t h e r t h e y h a v e t o go i n t o t h e I n t e r p l e a d e r A c t i o n 
22 a n d g e t t h e i r m o n e y . 
23 I t ' s my o p i n i o n t h a t a J u d g e M o f f a t t h a d 
24 j u r i s d i c t i o n t o g r a n t a s t a y i n t h a t a c t i o n s i n c e t h a t 


























a c t i o n f i l e d w i t h t h a t C o u r t . C o u r s e h e t h o u g h t 
o t h e r w i s e . Who h a s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o g r a n t t h a t s t a y 
i s a q u e s t i o n . But I am s a y i n g t h a t I d e f i n i t e l y , and 
I ' m r u l i n g , t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f i s o n l y e n t i t l e d t o 
r e l e a s e a g a i n s t t h e b o n d . And w h e t h e r t h e y can g e t in 
ana g e : t h e money f i r s t o r w h e t h e r i t has t o go t h r o u g h 
t h e I n t e r p l e a d e r A c t i o n , t h e Supreme C o u r t k i c k s i i back 
h e r e , I g u e s s w e ' l l h a v e t o l o o k a t i t a g a i n i f t h e y 
w a n t t o r u l e on i t , t h e n I g u e s s t h e y ' l l make t h e 
d e c i s i o n . 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: Thank y o u , Your H o n o r . 
THE COURT: And , as I s a y , maybe t h i s wno le 
R u l i n g of mine i s mute b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
But I am s t a t i n g t h a t p o s i t i o n . 
HR. PARKEN: I 'm w o n d e r i n g i f t h e C o u r t w a n t s 
t o s p e c i f y s o as t o a v o i d o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e O r d e r u n d e r 
w h a t R u l e C o u r t i s a m e n d i n g i t s e a r l i e r j u d g m e n t t o 
l i m i t , as you s a y , our j u d g m e n t t o t h e b o n d . 
MR. BRAITHUAITE: I s t h e C o u r t a m e n d i n g i t s 
p r i o r o r d e r o r e n t e r i n g a new o r d e r ? 
THE COURT: W e l l , I ' m r u l i n g - - I d o n ' t know 
w h a t y o u - - I h a v e n ' t r e a d y o u r j u d g m e n t . I f y o u r 
j u d g m e n t j u s t s a y s a b l a n k e t j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t W e s t e r n 
S u r e t y t h e n I t h i n k t h a t ' s i n c o r r e c t . I t h i n k y o u ' r e 
e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e amount of t h e bond of 



























l / r - s t s m S u r e t y er t h : : c n J i t s e l f . And / i h ^ t , i : r t ! : i s i s 
- - of c o ' j r s ? y o u ' r e t o s t a!: ? t h e a l t e r c i i o n I g u e s s 
t h e r e ' s a 1 ; - d a y s i t u a t i o n t h e r e , b u t I t h i n k t h e 
j u d g m e n t i t s e l f i s v o i d , and I thin.< u n d e r R j l e - - _ 
tfR. BRAITHUAITE: 6 0 ( b ) . 
THE COURT: To v o i d j u d g m e n t . I t n i nk th e 
j u d g m e n t i t s ? I f i s v c i J . 
MR PARKEN: T o u t ' s t h e b a s i s of y o u r r u l i n g ? 
THE COURT: I f t h a t ' s t h e way i t ' s w o r d e d , I 
h a v e n ' t r e a d y o u r j u d g m e n t . I ' m s p y i n g t n a t ny j u a g m e n t 
w o u l d o n l y go a g a i n s t lies t e r n S u r e t y a g a i n s t t h e bend* 
And I d o n ' t KHO./ how y o u r j u d g m e n t r e a d s . 
MR. PARKEN: And t h e o r d e r s h o u l d r e f l e c t t h a t 
t h a t ' s p u r s u a n t t o 7 u l e 6 1 ( G ) ? 
THE COURT: W e l l , I h a v e n ' t c h e c k e d i t . I s 
t h a t r i g h t , c o u n s e l ? I know j u d g m e n t — 5 0 ( b ) s a y s i f a 
j u d g m e n t i s v o i d , i s n ' t t h a t t h e one? 
MR. BRAITHWAITE: 5 0 ( D ) s u b 5 r e f e r s t o 
j u d g m e n t s t h a t a r e v o i d . 6 0 ( b ) sub 1 r e f e r s t o m i s -
t a k e s , i n a d v e r t e n c e , e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t . 
THE COURT: I t h i n k i t ' s r e a l l y b o t n . I f 
y o u ' v e g e t i t w o r o e d s u c n t h a t i t ' s a g a i n s t t h e m I 
t h i n k i t ' s a m i s t a k e . I t n i n K i t ' s a v o i c j u d g m e n t . 
M R . P A R K E H : O k a y . 




























THE COURT: O k a y . 
( T H E R E U P O N , t h 3 M o t i o n w a s 
c o n c l u d e d . ) 
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